

Local Fact Change Logic, Memory Logic and Expressive Power


Declan Thompson
Stanford University

LIRa, ILLC, 13 February 2020


Talk Overview

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Local Fact Change
- 3 Expressive Power
- 4 Open Problems


A simple game




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Boolean Network Games

Game Definition

- A set of *players* W
- An accessibility relation $R \subseteq W \times W$
- A goal formula γ

Strategies

A strategy for $s \in W$ is a choice of propositional letters. A strategy profile is a function $V : W \rightarrow 2^{\text{Prop}}$, i.e. a valuation on (W, R) .

Outcomes

s wins under V iff $(W, R), V, s \models \gamma$.

Local Fact Change (LFC)

A logic for propositional control in a network.

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$\mathfrak{F}, V, s \models p$	iff	$p \in V(s)$
$\mathfrak{F}, V, s \models \neg\varphi$	iff	$\mathfrak{F}, V, s \not\models \varphi$
$\mathfrak{F}, V, s \models (\varphi \wedge \psi)$	iff	$\mathfrak{F}, V, s \models \varphi$ and $\mathfrak{F}, V, s \models \psi$
$\mathfrak{F}, V, s \models \diamond\varphi$	iff	$\mathfrak{F}, V, t \models \varphi$ for some t with Rst

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
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
\bigcirc changes the valuation *but only at the current state*.

$$\bullet \varphi := \neg \bigcirc \neg \varphi$$

Example




Example



$$s \models \neg Y \wedge \bigcirc Y$$


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


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
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$$\gamma := (R \wedge \square \neg R) \vee (Y \wedge \square \neg Y) \vee (G \wedge \square \neg G) \vee (B \wedge \square \neg B)$$

Example



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
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$$s \models \bigcirc \gamma \quad s \models \bigcirc(\gamma \wedge \diamond \bullet \neg \gamma) \quad s \models \bigcirc \diamond \bigcirc \diamond \bigcirc(\gamma \wedge \square \gamma)$$

Example



$$s \models \neg Y \wedge \bigcirc Y$$

$$s \models \bigcirc(Y \leftrightarrow \blacklozenge \neg Y)$$

$$s \models \bullet \blacklozenge B$$

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$$s \models \bigcirc \gamma \quad s \models \bigcirc(\gamma \wedge \blacklozenge \neg \gamma) \quad s \models \bigcirc \blacklozenge \bigcirc \blacklozenge \bigcirc(\gamma \wedge \square \gamma)$$

Nash equilibria

V is a Nash equilibrium iff $\exists \gamma, V, t \models \gamma \vee \bullet \neg \gamma$ for all t .

Some initial results about LFC

Fact

$\mathfrak{F}, V, s \models \bigcirc \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{F}, V_A^s, s \models \varphi$ for some $A \subseteq \text{At}(\varphi)$.

Translation into FOL

Exists, but with exponential blow-up. Examples:

$$T(\bigcirc p, x, \emptyset) = Px \vee \neg Px$$

$$T(\bigcirc \diamond p, x, \emptyset) = \exists y (Rxy \wedge ((x = y \rightarrow \neg Px) \wedge (x \neq y \rightarrow Px))) \\ \vee \exists y (Rxy \wedge ((x = y \rightarrow Px) \wedge (x \neq y \rightarrow Px)))$$

Some initial results about LFC

Theorem

Model checking for LFC is PSPACE hard.

Proof.

Via reduction from TQBF. Idea: represent variable x_i by the value of p in state s_i , and give each state a unique label q_i . Then translate x_i to $\square(q_i \rightarrow p)$. □

- We can show model checking for LFC is in PSPACE by a direct argument, but not via translation to FOL.

Particularised fact change

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$$\text{Bool}(A) := \left\{ \bigwedge_{p \in B} p \wedge \neg \bigvee_{p \in A \setminus B} p \mid B \subseteq A \right\}$$

$$\textcircled{p} \varphi := \bigwedge_{\psi \in \text{Bool}(\text{At}(\varphi) \setminus \{p\})} (\psi \rightarrow \textcircled{p} (p \wedge \psi \wedge \varphi))$$

Example

$$\textcircled{p}(q \vee p) = (q \rightarrow \textcircled{p}(p \wedge q \wedge (q \vee p))) \wedge (\neg q \rightarrow \textcircled{p}(p \wedge \neg q \wedge (q \vee p)))$$

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Definition (Truth in a model (Memory Logic))

$$\mathfrak{F}, V, C, s \models_M \textcircled{r}\varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad \mathfrak{F}, V, C \cup \{s\}, s \models_M \varphi$$

Memory Logic (M)

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We say $\mathfrak{F}, V, s \models_M \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{F}, V, \emptyset, s \models_M \varphi$.

Memory Logic (M)

Examples

$$\textcircled{r} \blacklozenge \textcircled{r} \blacklozenge \textcircled{k}$$

$$\textcircled{r} \square \neg \textcircled{k}$$

$$\textcircled{r} \square (p \rightarrow \blacklozenge \textcircled{k})$$

Memory Logic (M)

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$$\textcircled{r} \diamond \textcircled{r} \diamond \textcircled{k}$$

$$\textcircled{r} \square \neg \textcircled{k}$$

$$\textcircled{r} \square (p \rightarrow \diamond \textcircled{k})$$

Theorem

The satisfiability problem for memory logic is undecidable (Mera 2009).

Undecidability of LFC

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Main idea

We translate satisfiability problems for M to satisfiability problems for LFC.

$$\begin{array}{ll} \tau(p, q) = p & \tau(\varphi \wedge \psi, q) = \tau(\varphi, q) \wedge \tau(\psi, q) \\ \tau(\neg\varphi, q) = \neg\tau(\varphi, q) & \tau(\diamond\varphi, q) = \diamond\tau(\varphi, q) \\ \tau(\textcircled{k}, q) = q & \tau(\textcircled{r}\varphi, q) = \textcircled{q}\tau(\varphi, q). \end{array}$$

$$T(\varphi, q) = \tau(\varphi, q) \wedge \bigwedge_{0 \leq i \leq \text{MD}(\varphi)} \square^i \neg q$$

If $q \notin \text{At}(\varphi)$ then φ is satisfiable in M iff $T(\varphi, q)$ is satisfiable in LFC.

This translation does not preserve truth.

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This translation does not preserve truth.

T is not truth preserving

$$s \longrightarrow t$$

Suppose $V(t) = \text{Prop}$. Then

$$s \models_M \textcircled{r} \diamond \neg \textcircled{k}$$

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for any q .

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A question

Does a truth preserving translation exist? What is the relative expressive power of M and LFC?

Comparing expressive power

Definition (\preceq , “no more distinctions”)

$A \preceq B$ if every pair of models equivalent under B is equivalent under A .

Definition (\leq , “translation”)

Let A, B be logics. $A \leq B$ if there is a translation $\mathfrak{T} : \mathcal{L}_A \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_B$ such that for all models \mathfrak{M} ,

$$\mathfrak{M} \models_A \varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad \mathfrak{M} \models_B \mathfrak{T}(\varphi).$$

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Fact

If $A \leq B$ then $A \preceq B$.

Comparing expressive power

Standard approach

To show $A \leq B$, provide a translation.

To show $A \not\leq B$, show $A \not\equiv B$.

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To show $A \leq B$, provide a translation.

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To show $M \not\leq \text{LFC}$, it suffices to find a pair of models M can distinguish that LFC cannot.

Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé Games for LFC

$EF(\mathfrak{F}_1, \mathfrak{F}_2, V_1, V_2, s_1, s_2)$

- If $V_1(s_1) \neq V_2(s_2)$ then Spoiler wins.
- Else if both s_1 and s_2 have no neighbours then Duplicator wins.
- Else Spoiler chooses one of the following two moves:
 - 2 The following occur in order:
 - 1 Spoiler chooses $i \in \{1, 2\}$ (j is the other)
 - 2 Spoiler chooses $t_i \in W_i$ such that $R_i s_i t_i$.
 - 3 If there is no t_j with $R_j s_j t_j$, Spoiler wins. Otherwise, Duplicator picks such a t_j . We play $EF(\mathfrak{F}_1, \mathfrak{F}_2, V_1, V_2, t_1, t_2)$.

In an infinite game, Duplicator wins.

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In an infinite game, Duplicator wins.

Fact

If Duplicator has a winning strategy then for all φ , $\mathfrak{F}_1, V_1, s_1 \models_{\text{LFC}} \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{F}_2, V_2, s_2 \models_{\text{LFC}} \varphi$.

$M \not\leq LFC$

We find a pair of models M can distinguish that LFC cannot.


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
\mathcal{G}_1 $s \curvearrowright$

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


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
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


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


$$\mathcal{G}_1, V, s \models_M \mathbf{r} \diamond \mathbf{k}$$



$$\mathcal{G}_2, V, t \not\models_M \mathbf{r} \diamond \mathbf{k}$$

M $\not\leq$ LFC (cont.)



Duplicator has a winning strategy in LFC

- s and t have the same valuation and every node has a neighbour.
- For every node spoiler picks, there is an *unvisited* node with the same valuation.

M $\not\leq$ LFC: Argument summary

M $\not\leq$ LFC

M can distinguish \mathcal{G}_1 and \mathcal{G}_2 and LFC cannot

\Rightarrow M $\not\leq$ LFC

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LFC $\not\leq$ M

Proof.

Adaptation of proof in Areces, D. Figueira, S. Figueira, et al. (2011). Uses infinite models to show LFC $\not\leq$ M. \square

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What about finite models?

Restricted EF Games for LFC

$EF_R(\mathfrak{F}_1, \mathfrak{F}_2, V_1, V_2, s_1, s_2)$

- If $V_1(s_1) \neq V_2(s_2)$ then Spoiler wins.
- Else if both s_1 and s_2 have no neighbours then Duplicator wins.
- Else Spoiler chooses one of the following two moves:
 - 1 Spoiler picks $A \subseteq \text{Prop}$. We play $EF(\mathfrak{F}_1, \mathfrak{F}_2, V_1^{s_1}, V_2^{s_2}, s_1, s_2)$.
 - 2 The following occur in order:
 - 1 Spoiler chooses $i \in \{1, 2\}$ (j is the other)
 - 2 Spoiler chooses $t_i \in W_i$ such that $R_i s_i t_i$.
 - 3 If there is no t_j with $R_j s_j t_j$, Spoiler wins. Otherwise, Duplicator picks such a t_j . We play $EF(\mathfrak{F}_1, \mathfrak{F}_2, V_1, V_2, t_1, t_2)$.

In an infinite game, Duplicator wins.

Restricted EF Games for LFC

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Fact

If Duplicator has a winning strategy, $MD(\varphi) \leq n$ and $At(\varphi) \subseteq B$,
 $\mathfrak{F}_1, V_1, s_1 \models_{LFC} \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{F}_2, V_2, s_2 \models_{LFC} \varphi$.

$M \not\leq LFC$ on finite models

Suppose $T : \mathcal{L}_M \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_{LFC}$, and $\psi = T(\textcircled{r} \diamond \textcircled{k})$.



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
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- Duplicator has the same winning strategy as before in $EF_R(\mathfrak{G}_1, \mathfrak{G}_2, V_1, V_2, s, t, B, n)$.

$M \not\leq LFC$ on finite models: Argument summary

$M \not\leq LFC$ on finite models

Suppose $T : \mathcal{L}_M \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_{LFC}$.

Construct \mathfrak{G}_1 and \mathfrak{G}_2

$\textcircled{r} \diamond \textcircled{k}$ distinguishes \mathfrak{G}_1 and \mathfrak{G}_2 but $T(\textcircled{r} \diamond \textcircled{k})$ does not

$\Rightarrow T$ is not truth preserving on finite models

\Rightarrow There is no translation $T : \mathcal{L}_M \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_{LFC}$ that preserves truth on finite models

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
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
We bypassed \preceq .

BUT!

Fix n and $B \subsetneq \text{Prop}$. Take $q \notin B$.




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
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$$\mathfrak{G}_1, s \models_{\text{LFC}} \bigcirc \diamond q$$



$$\mathfrak{G}_2, t \not\models_{\text{LFC}} \bigcirc \diamond q$$

- So LFC can distinguish all our countermodels.

$M \preceq$ LFC on finite models

Lemma

For finite pointed models \mathfrak{F}_1, V_1, s_1 and \mathfrak{F}_2, V_2, s_2 , the following are equivalent:

- 1 Duplicator has a winning strategy in $EF(\mathfrak{F}_1, \mathfrak{F}_2, V_1, V_2, s_1, s_2)$.
- 2 For every $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}_{LFC}$ we have $\mathfrak{F}_1, V_1, s_1 \models_{LFC} \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{F}_2, V_2, s_2 \models_{LFC} \varphi$.

Theorem

If Duplicator has a winning strategy in $EF(\mathfrak{F}_1, \mathfrak{F}_2, V_1, V_2, s_1, s_2)$, with $\mathfrak{F}_1, \mathfrak{F}_2$ finite, then for all $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}_M$,

$$\mathfrak{F}_1, V_1, s_1 \models_M \varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad \mathfrak{F}_2, V_2, s_2 \models_M \varphi.$$

Proof.

Via a version of bisimulation for LFC. □

Summary

Corollary

$M \preceq$ LFC *on finite models*.

What do we know?

- M and LFC are incomparable in general.
- $M \not\preceq$ LFC and $LFC \not\preceq$ M for finite models.
- $M \preceq$ LFC for finite models.

Open questions

Expressive Power

- Is $LFC \preceq M$ on finite models?
- What other situations do \leq and \preceq give different judgements?
- What other notions of relative expressive power are interesting?
- Relationship with other logics (e.g. Hybrid logic)?

General

- What is the exact relationship between LFC and Nash equilibria for BNGs? Can we say the logic of Nash equilibria is undecidable?
- What is a natural, efficient translation of LFC to FOL?
- Axiomatisation?
- Tableau system? (c.f. Areces, D. Figueira, Gorín, et al. 2009)

How can we make LFC decidable?

- Restrict the class of models.
 - For DAGs, LFC is decidable.
- Modify \bigcirc .
 - Only a subset of valuations are available (c.f. generalised assignment models): remains undecidable.
 - \bigcirc changes the valuation *somewhere* (maybe not here): conjecture remains undecidable.
 - \bigcirc updates all bisimilar points: conjecture becomes decidable.

Thank you

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Related Work

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- PDL with local and global assignments to propositional variables: PDL+GLA (Tiomkin and Makowsky 1985)

Translation into FOL

$$T(\neg\varphi, x, V) := \neg T(\varphi, x, V)$$

$$T(\varphi \vee \psi, x, V) := T(\varphi, x, V) \vee T(\psi, x, V)$$

$$T(\diamond\varphi, x, V) := \exists y (Rxy \wedge T(\varphi, y, V)) \quad [y \text{ is new}]$$

$$T(\bigcirc\varphi, x, V) := \bigvee_{A \subseteq \text{At}(\varphi)} T(\varphi, x, V_A^x)$$

$$T(p, x, V) := \begin{cases} \neg P_x & \text{if } p \in V(y) \text{ for the most recent } y \\ & \text{such that } x = y, V(y) \text{ defined} \\ P_x & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\models \Box^n p \leftrightarrow (\bullet \Box^n p \vee (\bullet (p \leftrightarrow \Box^n p) \wedge p))$$

Definition (Isobisimulation)

Let $\mathfrak{M}_1 = (W_1, R_1, V_1)$ and $\mathfrak{M}_2 = (W_2, R_2, V_2)$. A relation $Z \subseteq W_1 \times W_2$ is an *isobisimulation* if the following clauses hold:

Non-empty $Z \neq \emptyset$

Agree If $s_1 Z s_2$ then $V_1(s_1) = V_2(s_2)$.

Zig If $s_1 Z s_2$ and $R_1 s_1 t_1$ then there is t_2 with $R_2 s_2 t_2$.

Zag If $s_1 Z s_2$ and $R_2 s_2 t_2$ then there is t_1 with $R_1 s_1 t_1$.

Isomorphism If $s_1 Z s_2$ then there is an isomorphism

$f : SCC(s_1) \rightarrow SCC(s_2)$ such that $f(s_1) = s_2$.

Boolean Games

- We have a set Prop of propositions.
- Each player controls a subset of Prop.
- Each player s has a formula γ_s of propositional logic as their *goal*.
- By choosing the valuation on their propositions, s tries to make γ_s true.

Boolean Network Games

- Players are arranged in a network.
- Each player controls *all the propositions at their position*.
- Each player s has a formula γ_s of *modal* logic as their goal.
- By choosing the valuation *at their position*, s tries to make γ_s true.

BNGs: Strategies and equilibria

Definition (Strategy (profile))

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How can we make this definition more precise? We need a logical way to talk about *changing strategies*.

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- V is a Nash equilibrium iff $\mathfrak{F}, V, s \models \bigcirc \gamma_s \rightarrow \gamma_s$ for every player s .

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- How expressive is it?